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	by		JEFFREY	K.	MCDONOUGH	(HARVARD)			“…	the	principle	of	perfection	is	not	limited	to	the	general	but	descends	also	to	the	particulars	of	things	and	of	phenomena	…	in	this	respect	it	closely	resembles	the	method	of	optimal	forms	…	For	in	these	forms	or	figures	the	optimum	is	found	not	only	in	the	whole	but	also	in	each	part,	and	it	would	not	even	suffice	in	the	whole	without	this.	…	It	is	in	this	way	that	the	smallest	parts	of	the	universe	are	ruled	in	accordance	with	the	order	of	greatest	perfection;	otherwise	the	whole	world	would	not	be	so	ruled.”2			 		 Introduction		 It	is	tempting	to	suppose	of	Leibniz’s	account	of	monadic	agency	what	many	have	supposed	of	his	philosophy	in	general,	namely,	that	in	spite	of	being	full	of	intriguing	insights,	positions,	and	arguments,	its	elements	ultimately	fail	to	form	a	coherent,	unified	system.		And,	indeed,	it	should	be	conceded	that	grounds	for	doubting	the	systematicity	of	Leibniz’s	thought	are	especially	strong	in	the	case	of	monadic	agency.		As	we	will	see	in	greater	detail	below,	he	appears	to	endorse	contradictory	views	on	the	nature	of	monadic	teleology;	his	account	of	creaturely	appetition	has	seemed	to	many	manifestly	untenable;	and	it	remains	far	from	clear	how	even	the	most	basic	threads	of	his	psychology	might	be	consistently	woven	together.			Someone	who	had	encountered	only	Leibniz’s	writings	on	the	agency	of	finite	minds	might	understandably	take	him	to	be	a	sporadically	insightful,	but	not	very	coherent	thinker.			
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									 																																				Figure	3	 	 		 	 				Figure	4															It	is	perhaps	easiest	to	see	why	this	should	be	so	by	reductio:	if	every	segment	of	a	catenary	did	not	itself	minimize	its	potential	energy	under	the	given	constraints,	then	it	would	be	possible	to	alter	or	replace	that	segment	so	that	the	potential	energy	of	the	catenary	would	be	less	even	assuming	the	same	conditions.		On	pain	of	allowing	that	a	cord	might	realize	a	potential	energy	less	than	its	minimum	value,	every	segment	of	a	catenary	must	therefore	itself	be	a	catenary.			 In	examples	like	the	catenary,	Leibniz	saw	the	possibility	of	an	intriguing	and	powerful	model	of	teleology	at	work	within	the	natural	world.		From	the	vantage	provided	by	the	notion	of	an	optimal	form,	it	is	possible	to	explain	the	resting	shape	of	a	hanging	cord	in	terms	of	a	consequence	of	that	shape,	and	the	behavior	of	a	disturbed	chain	in	terms	of	the	outcome	of	its	behavior,	thus	making	possible	putatively	teleological	explanations	of	the	resting	shape	and	restoring	movements	of	hanging	cords.		Such	prima	facie	teleological	explanations	were	especially	enticing	to	Leibniz	because	they	promised	to	put	explanations	in	terms	of	final	“causes”	or	reasons	on	a	mathematical,	predictive,	and	even	lawful	par	with	efficient,	mechanical	explanations:		appealing	to	the	notion	of	an	optimal	form,	Leibniz	could	predict,	for	examples,	the	shape	of	a	freely	hanging	cord,	or	the	trajectory	of	a	ray	of	light,	and	in	principle	the	shape	



















































                                                29	It	is,	of	course,	important	not	to	confuse	the	law	of	objective	teleology	as	defined	above	with	a	law	according	to	which	each	monad	must	realize	what	is	objectively	best	for	it	per	se.		Unless	taken	to	hold	trivially	–	for	example	in	virtue	of	super	essentialism	–	Leibniz	clearly	does	not	accept	any	such	law.		In	whatever	sense	we	may	say,	for	example,	that	Judas	might	not	have	sinned,	we	may	also	say	that	it	would	have	been	better	for	Judas	per	se	had	he	not	sinned.	
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include	the	option	that	I	would	most	prefer.		I	might	really	want	a	scoop	of	strawberry	ice	cream,	but	have	to	choose	between	chocolate	and	vanilla	because	those	are	the	only	options	presented.		In	maintaining	that	finite	agents	always	will	what	they	perceive	to	be	the	best,	Leibniz	should	be	understood	as	maintaining	that	they	always	will	what	they	perceive	to	be	the	best	among	the	options	available	to	them,	and	he	is	quite	explicit,	for	example,	in	emphasizing	that	“The	soul	is	not	able	always	to	give	itself	pleasant	feelings,	since	the	feelings	it	has	are	dependent	on	those	it	has	had.”30			Second,	Leibniz	can	allow	that	in	optimizing	their	overall	inclinations	creatures	may	neglect	what	is	their	strongest	inclination	considered	individually.		At	the	ice	cream	store,	my	single	strongest	inclination	might	be	to	order	two	scoops	of	chocolate,	but	I	might	also	desire	a	cup	of	coffee,	be	worried	about	my	diet,	and	want	enough	change	for	the	parking	meter.		Optimizing	these	inclinations	may	well	result	in	my	compromising	my	strongest	inclination	–	I	may	order	one	scoop	instead	of	two,	get	the	coffee,	and	pay	the	meter	my	leftover	change.31		As	Leibniz	himself	points	out,	in	such	cases	my	inclinations	considered	in	isolation	may	be	likened	to	God’s	antecedent	will	which	“considers	each	good	separately	in	the	capacity	of	a	good”	while	my	optimized	will	may	be	likened	to	God’s	consequent	will	which	“results	from	the	conflict	of	all	the	antecedent	wills”	and	to	which	alone	“Success	entire	and	infallible	belongs.”32		Third,	Leibniz	can	allow	that	creatures	may	fail	to	optimize	their	own	subjective	good	due	to	their	imperfect	knowledge	of	the	world.		Thus,	for	example,	I	might	act	under	the	guise	of	the	good	in	taking	a	big	bite	of	my	ice	cream	sundae	–	I	may	perceive	that	state	of	affairs	as	the	best	overall	state	of	affairs	available	to	me.	But	I	might	be	wrong.		In	that	bite	of	sundae	there	might	be	a	hard	rock	that	I	fail	to	perceive	with	sufficient	clarity,	or	the	perception	of	which	does	not	rise	to	the	level	of	my	consciousness	before	I	break	my	tooth	on	it.		Indeed,	I	may	well	not	recognize	my	mistake	until	only	after	it	is	too	late	to	fully	avoid	the	pain	the	rock	will	cause	me	so	that	the	most	I	can	do	is	attempt	to	minimize	my	suffering,	perhaps	by	stopping	my	bite	halfway	through,	or	by	holding	my	jaw	with	my	hand,	or	even	by	going	to	the	dentist	immediately	after	the	fact.		A	creature	may	thus	optimize	what	appears	to	be	best	to	it,	and	still	









                                                36	Rutherford	puts	the	point	himself	this	way:		The	lesson	of	Bayle’s	dog,	as	I	read	it,	is	that	if	appetition	is	the	internal	force,	or	endeavor,	that	explains	the	transition	of	the	dog’s	soul	from	a	state	of	pleasure	to	a	state	of	pain,	then	that	endeavor	cannot	operate	in	the	same	way	as	volitional	states	such	as	desire.		Appetition	cannot	be	understood	as	functioning	according	to	the	law	of	desire	teleology	[=subjective	teleology],	for	there	is	no	conceivable	scenario	under	which	the	dog	would	have	represented	its	subsequent	state	of	pain	as	a	good	relative	to	its	present	state	of	pleasure.”	“Leibniz	on	Spontaneity,”	p.	170.	
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didn’t	think	he	needed	them.		Although	this	is	not	the	place	for	a	full	treatment	of	Leibniz’s	textually	and	philosophically	complex	views	on	appetition,	we	might	–	since	the	issue	ultimately	ties	back	into	Leibniz’s	views	on	optimal	form	–	take	up	the	more	limited	task	of	showing	how	Leibniz	might	hope	to	resist	both	horns	as	well	as	the	framing	assumption	of	Rutherford’s	dilemma	without	abandoning	the	thesis	that	monad’s	always	follow	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.					With	respect	to	the	first	horn	of	Rutherford’s	dilemma,	it	should	be	conceded	that	from	a	contemporary	perspective	it	is	indeed	highly	implausible	to	suppose	that	–	pathological	cases	aside	–	we	have	subjective	appetites	for	painful	or	unpleasant	sensations	per	se.37		This	intuition	can	be	seen	as	reflecting	a	general	tendency	to	see	our	sensations	as	falling	on	a	preference	scale	running	from	pleasant	sensations	to	the	absence	of	sensation	to	painful	sensations,	with	our	being	attracted	to	pleasant	sensations,	indifferent	to	the	absence	of	sensation,	and	averse	to	painful	sensations.		Leibniz,	however,	belongs	to	a	long-standing	apologist	tradition	that	generally	sees	things	quite	differently.		Christian	Neo-Platonists	typically	embrace	the	view	that	every	sensation,	insofar	as	it	is	an	existing	thing	or	affection,	is	good	and	desirable.		They	are	thus	inclined	to	insist	that	our	sensations	are	best	ordered	on	a	scale	running	from	pleasant	sensations	to	painful	sensations	to	the	absence	of	sensation,	with	painful	sensations	being	relatively	less	attractive	than	pleasant	ones,	but	still	always	preferable	to	the	absence	of	sensation	altogether.38		Thus	Augustine,	for	example,	notoriously	insists	that	one	would	have	to	prefer,	since	it	is	at	least	some	mode	of	existence,	even	the	eternal	suffering	of	hell	to	the	ultimate	evil	of	non-existence.39		In	light	of	his	sympathy	with	Augustine’s	views	on	the	nature	of	sin	and	evil,	Leibniz	could	maintain	that	finite	agents	have	subjective	appetites	for	all	their	specific	sensations,	even	relatively	unpleasant	ones,	as	well	as	an	aggregated	subjective	appetite	for	what	they	perceive	to	be	the	best	overall,	just	as	he	takes	God	to	have	an	antecedent	will	for	every	specific	creatures,	even	relatively	sinful	ones,	and	a	consequent	will	for	the	best	world	as	a	whole.40	In	doing	so,	he	could	reject	the	first	horn	of	Rutherford’s	dilemma	and	maintain	that	Bayle’s	dog	might,	strictly	speaking,	perceive	even	the	very	pain	of	the	blow	of	the	stick	as	something	desirable	per	se	while	still	insisting	that	it	is	nonetheless	much	less	desirable	than	other	sensations	that	the	dog	might	hope	to	experience.	Leibniz	could	also	reject	the	second	horn	of	Rutherford’s	dilemma.		In	general,	Leibniz	seems	to	hold	that	that	our	everyday	sensations	are	typically	complex	states	of	affairs,	mixtures	of	what	we	find	both	pleasant	and	unpleasant.		He	also	seems	to	think	that	those	complex	states	are	generally	analyzable	into	constituent	sensations	–	that	on	closer	inspection	our	everyday	sensations	reveal	
                                                37	See,	Rutherford,	“Leibniz	on	Spontaneity,”	pp.	171;	179,	fn	30	38	Some	evidence	that	this	approach	is	not	entirely	foreign	to	contemporary	ways	of	thinking	is	provided	by	anecdotal	reports	of	depressives,	who	are	reported	to	sometimes	forego	their	medications	on	the	grounds	that	they	would	rather	feel	miserable	than	numb,	rather	suffer	than	feel	nothing	at	all.	39	St.	Augustine,	De	Libero	Arbitrio,	in	Corpus	Christianorum:	Series	Latina,	volume	29,	W.	M.	Green	(ed.),	Brepols,	1970,	p.	286f.		Available	in	English	translation	in	Thomas	Williams	(ed.	and	trans.),	On	Free	Choice	of	Will,	Indianapolis,	Indiana	1993,	p.	83f.			40	GP	VI,	127	
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themselves	to	be	confusions	of	lesser	sensations.		It	is,	of	course,	tempting	to	suppose,	as	Rutherford’s	second	horn	suggests,	that	such	an	analysis	must	in	principle	come	to	an	end	somewhere,	terminating	in	a	final	level	of	analysis	in	which	our	sensations	would	be	fully	sorted	out	into	pure	pleasures	and	unadulterated	pains.	Leibniz’s	analysis	of	structurally	analogous	phenomena,	however,	generally	supports	a	rather	different	picture,	one	according	to	which	at	every	level	of	analysis	we	find	not	only	greater	resolution,	but	also	further	complexity.		Thus,	for	example,	Leibniz	suggests	that	a	full	analysis	of	the	organic	world	would	show	that	larger	creatures	contain	smaller	creatures	that	contain	smaller	creatures	all	the	way	down	so	that	there	is	no	final	level	of	analysis	at	which	there	are	creatures	that	cannot	themselves	be	resolved	further	into	still	smaller	creatures.41		Nothing	prevents	Leibniz	from	saying	something	quite	similar	about	our	appetites.		Our	manifest,	everyday	experiences	might	be	thought	of	as	being	constituted	by	mixtures	of	pleasurable	and	painful	sensations;	those	constituting	sensations	might	in	turn	be	thought	of	as	being	constituted	as	well	by	mixtures	of	pleasurable	and	unpleasurable	sensations,	and	so	on	all	the	way	down.		In	that	case,	Leibniz	could	maintain	that	even	our	everyday	sensations	may	involve	an	inextricable	mix	of	pleasurable	and	unpleasurable	sensations	in	the	sense	that	there	is	simply	no	level	of	analysis	at	which	particular	sensations	must	be	resolved	into	pure	pleasures	and	pure	pains.		Leibniz,	it	would	seem,	could	thus	not	only	reject	the	first	horn	of	Rutherford’s	dilemma	but	the	second	horn	as	well.	Finally,	and	most	significantly,	I	think	Leibniz	in	fact	implicitly	rejects	the	assumption	that	frames	Rutherford’s	dilemma.		The	intuition	that	there	must	be	a	specific	“local”	appetite	sufficient	for	bringing	about	each	specific	“local”	perception,	including	each	of	a	monad’s	sensations,	might	be	encouraged	by	the	assumption	that	Leibniz	means	to	offer	an	essentially	atomistic	or	reductionist	explanation	of	monadic	agency.		On	such	a	view,	it	might	be	thought	that	if	a	monad	produces	two	(possibly	complex,	but	not	global)	states	S1	and	S2,	then	there	must	be	two	distinct	(possibly	complex,	but	not	global)	appetitive	states	A1	and	A2	such	that	A1	exhaustively	explains	the	occurrence	of	S1	and	A2	exhaustively	explains	the	occurrence	of	S2.		So,	for	example,	it	might	be	thought	that	if	a	monad	comes	to	have	a	perception	an	ice	cream	cone	and	a	perception	of	a	cup	of	coffee,	it	must	have	had	an	appetite	for	an	ice	cream	cone	that	by	itself	explains	the	monad’s	coming	to	have	to	have	a	perception	of	an	ice	cream	cone	and	an	appetite	for	a	cup	of	coffee	that	by	itself	explains	the	monad’s	coming	to	have	a	perception	of	a	cup	of	coffee.	If	that	were	the	case,	Leibniz	would	indeed	be	committed	to	holding	that	there	must	be	a	specific	“local”	appetite	sufficient	for	bringing	about	each	specific	“local”	perception,	and	we	might	well	suppose	that	where	S1	is	a	painful	sensation	that	he	will	be	hard	pressed	to	maintain	that	its	corresponding	appetite	A1	is	a	subjective	appetite	(even	in	spite	of	the	subtleties	of	the	last	two	paragraphs).			Leibniz’s	explanations	in	terms	of	optimality,	however,	militate	against	any	such	atomistic	or	reductionist	explanatory	approach.		Indeed,	their	power	lies	precisely	in	their	ability	to	draw	together	into	a	single	explanation	both	local	and	global,	atomistic	and	holistic	considerations.		Leibniz’s	treatment	of	the	catenary,	for	example,	shows	how	the	states	of	each	link	of	a	hanging	chain	may	
                                                41	GP	III,	356;	GP	VI,	539-46;	A	VI.iv.1399	
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be	explained	by	taking	into	consideration	not	only	the	contributions	of	each	link	but	also	the	constraints	of	the	chain	as	a	whole.		An	atomistic	focus	on	any	one	individual	link	would	leave	unexplained,	for	example,	why	that	link	does	not	assume	a	lower	energy	state.	Leibniz’s	treatment	of	divine	agency	similarly	suggests	that	God’s	decision	to	create,	say,	Judas	can	only	be	explained	by	taking	into	consideration	not	only	the	worth	of	Judas	but	also	the	worth	of	every	other	possible	substance	and	the	constraints	governing	creation.		An	atomistic	focus	on	Judas	alone	would	leave	unexplained,	for	example,	why	God	does	not	create	a	less	egregious	sinner	(whether	that	less	egregious	sinner	is	a	modified	Judas	or	a	Judas	counterpart).		The	same	lesson,	I	think,	applies	in	the	case	of	monadic	agency.		A	monad’s	coming	to	have	any	particular	“local”	state	S1	can	only	be	fully	explained	by	taking	into	consideration	not	only	some	particular	“local”	appetite	A1	but	also	all	its	other	specific	local	appetites	as	well	as	the	constraints	imposed	by	its	point	of	view.42		A	narrow	focus	on,	say,	a	monad’s	appetite	for	two	scoops	of	chocolate	ice	cream	would	leave	unexplained	why	it	in	fact	comes	to	have	an	experience	of	one	scoop	of	ice	cream,	a	cup	of	coffee	and	some	leftover	change.		Reflection	on	how	Leibniz’s	optimality	explanations	work	thus	suggests	that	he	implicitly	rejects	Rutherford’s	framing	assumption,	that	is,	that	he	would	deny	that	specific	“local”	states	of	a	monad	can	always	be	explained	atomistically	by	appeal	to	specific	“local”	appetites.	It’s	worth	noting	that	Leibniz’s	explanatory	approach	to	monadic	agency	has	perhaps	unexpected	implications	for	how	we	should	understand	the	efficient	causal	structure	of	monads.		An	atomistic	explanatory	approach	encourages	the	view	that	the	true	causal	relata	of	monadic	agency	must	be	specific	“local”	states,	particular	appetites	and	particular	perceptions.	A	monad’s	transitioning	from	one	global	state	to	another	global	state	would	on	this	picture	be	a	derivative	consequence	of	its	local	appetites	bringing	about	local	perceptions.		A	monad	would	come	to	have	a	global	state	in	virtue	of	its	coming	to	have	all	the	local	states	that	constitute	that	global	state.		While	Leibniz’s	willingness	to	talk	of	particular	perceptions	and	particular	appetites	might	invite	such	a	picture,	a	reductionist	model	of	monadic	causation	turns	out	to	be	difficult	to	square	with	his	more	holistic	explanatory	approach	to	monadic	agency.	For	if	the	true	causal	relata	of	monadic	agency	are	local	appetites	and	local	perceptions,	we	should	want	an	account	of	how	exactly	we	are	to	understand	the	causal	influences	that	would	have	to	hold	between	rival	appetites	and	their	corresponding	perceptions.		If,	for	example,	A1	not	only	helps	to	explain	a	monad’s	coming	to	have	a	state	S1	but	also	a	state	S2,	how	are	we	supposed	to	understand	the	causal	influence	of	A1	




                                                43	The	same	lesson,	I	think,	applies	in	the	case	of	divine	agency.		It	should	not	be	supposed	that	God’s	consequent	will	is	literally	a	derivative	consequence	of	his	cumulative	antecedent	wills.		The	thought	that	God	could	have	genuinely	efficacious,	yet	inconsistent	wills,	most	of	which	are	ultimately	frustrated	is	at	best	semi-coherent.		Better	to	suppose	that	God’s	antecedent	wills	are	merely	explanatorily	useful	decompositions	of	his	consequent	will;	they	are	not	causally	efficacious	per	se,	but	rather	afford	us	a	way	of	understanding	God’s	consequent	will,	which	is	efficacious	per	se.	
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creatures	that	could	be	appropriately	described	as	finding	and	burying	acorns	for	the	winter,	damming	rivers	to	improve	their	environment,	and	even	returning	library	books	in	order	to	avoid	late	fees.44		In	spite	of	the	already	rich	resources	of	his	theory,	however,	Leibniz	nonetheless	clearly	wishes	to	carve	out	a	special	role	for	reason	in	the	teleological	unfolding	of	monads.		But	what	role	exactly?		An	important	clue	to	Leibniz’s	thinking	on	this	point	is	provided	by	a	well	known,	but	I	think	not	fully	understood,	passage	from	the	New	Essays.		It	begins	with	Leibniz	suggesting	that	appetites	are	“the	first	steps	that	nature	makes	us	take;	not	so	much	towards	happiness	as	towards	joy,	since	in	them	one	looks	only	to	the	present”	and	his	noting	that	“experience	and	reason”	can	nonetheless	“teach	us	to	govern	and	moderate	them	so	that	they	can	lead	us	to	happiness.”45	The	passage	continues	with	the	following	striking	analogy:		“Appetitions	are	like	a	stone’s	endeavor	to	follow	the	shortest	but	not	always	the	best	route	to	the	center	of	the	earth;	it	cannot	foresee	that	it	will	collide	with	rocks	on	which	it	will	shatter,	whereas	it	would	have	got	closer	to	its	goal	if	it	had	had	the	wit	and	the	means	to	swerve	aside.		In	the	same	way,	by	rushing	straight	at	a	present	pleasure	we	sometimes	fall	into	the	abyss	of	misery.		That	is	why	reason	opposes	appetition	with	images	of	greater	goods	or	evils	to	come,	and	with	a	firm	policy	and	practice	of	thinking	before	acting	and	then	standing	by	whatever	is	found	to	be	the	best	…”46	The	surface	implication	of	the	analogy	is,	I	think,	clear	enough:	non-rational	creatures,	and	indeed	rational	creatures	insofar	as	they	don’t	use	their	reason	(that	is,	most	of	us,	most	of	the	time)47	are	destined	to	be	driven	by	their	short-range	desires,	often	suffering	greater	miseries	as	a	result.		The	mouse	grabs	the	cheese	and	is	caught	in	a	trap;	I	impetuously	eat	too	much	dessert	and	regret	doing	so	later.48		There	is,	however,	also	a	deeper,	more	easily	overlooked	




	 	 	 	 					Figure	6		Intuitively,	the	actual	path	of	the	ray	of	light	–	indicated	in	Figure	6	by	the	solid	line	–	is	locally	optimal	in	the	sense	that	the	overall	path	could	not	be	improved	by	replacing	any	sufficiently	small	piece	with	a	“better”	small	piece.		Nonetheless,	the	path	is	not	globally	optimal	in	the	sense	that	there	is	another	path	from	the	light	source	to	the	observer	–	indicated	by	the	dashed	line	–	that	would	be	better	overall.		In	slightly	different	terms,	the	path	of	the	ray	of	light	in	the	case	depicted	in	the	diagram	is	locally	optimal	in	the	sense	that	it	follows	a	path	that	
                                                                                                                                       son	appartement.	C’est	sans	doute	une	honteuse	foiblesse,	mais	voilà	comme	les	hommes	sont	faits.		A	VI.vi.187		49	GP	VII,	275-277;	see	also	Unicum	Opticae,	Catoptricae	&	Dioptricae	Principium,	Dutens	pp.	145-150.			
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is	shorter	than	any	possible	nearby	path,	but	globally	non-optimal	in	the	sense	that	there	is	at	least	one	(non-nearby)	path	that	is	shorter	overall.50	With	this	local/global	asymmetry	in	mind,	we	can	see	more	clearly	that	Leibniz’s	falling	stone	analogy	suggests	a	surprisingly	precise	demarcation	between	the	capacities	afforded	to	non-rational	and	rational	creatures.		Non-rational	creatures	are,	for	Leibniz,	destined	to	always	follow	courses	of	action	that	are	locally,	but	not	necessarily	globally,	optimal.	They	are	somewhat	like	a	dog	lost	in	a	wood	that	follows	the	strategy	of	taking	whatever	path	is	immediately	less	strenuous.		If	all	goes	well,	the	dog	may	in	fact	follow	a	path	that	is	indeed	the	best	path	overall	–	perhaps	it	starts	at	one	end	of	a	long	valley	and	runs	to	the	other	end.		But	it	may	just	as	well	find	itself	following	a	path	that	is,	on	the	whole,	much	more	arduous	than	if	it	had	selected	a	few	uphill	paths	along	the	way.		By	rushing	at	present	pleasure,	it	may,	to	borrow	Leibniz’s	words,	fall	into	an	“abyss	of	misery.”		To	rational	creatures,	however,	Leibniz	attributes	additional	capacities	enabling	them,	in	principle,	to	avoid	merely	locally	optimal	courses	of	action	in	favor	of	globally	optimal	courses	of	action.		Reason	allows	us,	according	to	Leibniz,	to	be	more	like	hikers	with	maps,	who	may	reliably	chart	courses	that	are	easiest	overall,	not	simply	easiest	at	each	juncture.		They	have,	in	Leibniz’s	words,	the	“the	wit	and	means	to	swerve	aside,”	to	avoid	pitfalls	and	dead	ends,	and	thereby	to	come	closer	to	achieving	their	overarching	goals.		If	the	teleological	agency	of	finite	creatures	maps	neatly	onto	Leibniz’s	understanding	of	optimal	forms,	his	distinction	between	non-rational	and	rational	creatures	corresponds	equally	well	to	the	asymmetry	of	the	relationship	between	local	and	global	optimization.			Leibniz’s	falling	stone	analogy,	and	the	asymmetry	it	suggests,	however,	might	invite	anew	the	suspicion	that	at	least	some	monads	are	not	always	subject	to	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.		For	one	way	in	which	reason	might	provide	rational	creatures	with	the	ability	to	follow	globally	optimal	courses	of	action	is	by	providing	them	with	the	ability	to	act	contrary	to	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.		On	such	a	picture,	reason	would	be	like	a	miraculous	power	allowing	creatures	like	us	to	will	a	state	of	affairs	other	than	that	which,	in	our	present	state,	appears	to	us	to	be	best	overall.		And,	indeed,	one	might	see	Leibniz	himself	as	advocating	for	such	a	view	in	suggesting	that	reason’s	role	is	“all	a	matter	of	‘Think	carefully’	and	‘Remember’	–	by	the	first	to	make	laws,	and	by	the	second	to	follow	them	even	when	we	do	not	remember	the	reasons	from	which	they	sprang.”51		For	one	might	understandably	see	in	this	remark	the	suggestion	that	reason	might	allow	us,	as	rational	creatures,	to	formulate	rules	that	we	might	then	steadfastly	abide	by	even	when	those	rules	seem	to	run	contrary	to	our	overall	inclinations.		On	this	picture,	I	might,	for	example,	use	reason	to	formulate	a	rule	to	never	lie	to	anyone	at	anytime,	and	then	abide	by	



















                                                61	M.	Serres,	Le	Système	de	Leibniz,	Paris	1968,	pp.	7-90.	See	also	D.	Garber,	“Leibniz	and	the	Foundations	of	Physics:		The	Middle	Years,”	in:	Kathleen	Okruhlik	and	James	Brown	(eds.),	The	Natural	Philosophy	of	Leibniz,	Dordrecht	1985,	p.	73.	62	C.	Wilson,	“The	Illusory	Nature	of	Leibniz’s	System,”	in:	Rocco	Gennaro	and	Charles	Huenemann	(eds.),	New	Essays	on	the	Rationalists,	New	York	1999,	pp.	373-388.	Cf.	G.	Hartz,	Leibniz’s	Final	System:		Monads,	Matter	and	Animals,	New	York	2007,	pp.	14-18.			63	The	set	up	of	this	conclusion,	my	own	recent	thinking	about	the	systematicity	of	Leibniz’s	philosophy	more	generally,	was	prompted	by	my	response	to	D.	Garber,	“Metaphysics	and	Theology:	The	Role	of	the	Monadology	in	Leibniz's	
Essais	de	Théodicée,”	presented	at	a	conference	entitled	Leibniz's	Theodicy:	
Context	and	Content	hosted	by	the	University	of	Notre	Dame	in	September	of	2010.		It	should	be	noted	that	Garber	has	since	moderated	his	position	concerning	the	systematicity	of	Leibniz’s	work.		His	astronomical	metaphor	nonetheless	brings	out	rather	elegantly,	I	think,	a	quite	natural	and	tempting	view	of	Leibniz’s	thinking.		
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monads	are	to	be	reconciled	with	his	psychological	foundation	of	tiny	inclinations	and	petite	perceptions.		And	if	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	the	threads	of	Leibniz’s	treatment	of	finite	agency	might	themselves	be	coherently	woven	together,	it	is	admittedly	even	harder	to	see	how	they	might	be	tied	into	other	aspects	of	his	far-ranging	thought.		How	they	might	be	related	to,	for	example,	his	much-vaunted	work	in	mathematics	and	the	natural	sciences.		It	is	indeed	tempting	to	conclude	that	Leibniz’s	thinking	about	finite	agency	represents	at	best	a	loose	array	of	semi-consistent	theses	developed	in	perhaps	fortunate	isolation	from	his	other	more	promising	studies.			The	aim	of	the	present	essay,	of	course,	has	been	to	suggest	that	there	are,	after	all,	good	reasons	for	remaining	optimistic	with	respect	to	both	the	internal	coherence	of	Leibniz’s	views	on	human	agency	and	their	systematic	relation	to	other	areas	of	his	thought.		Towards	that	end,	it	has	been	argued	most	centrally	that	attention	to	Leibniz’s	notion	of	an	optimal	form	shows	how	many	of	the	apparent	tensions	in	his	treatment	of	finite	agency	may	be	resolved:	how	monads	might	always	will	what	seems	best	to	them	individually	and	what	is	in	fact	best	for	the	world	as	a	whole;	how	finite	spirits	might	remain	imperfect	and	miserable	even	as	they	continually	strive	in	causal	isolation	for	what	seems	best	to	them	given	their	unique	perspectives	and	limitations;	how	reason	might	play	a	substantive	role	even	in	minds	determined	to	unfold	in	accordance	with	their	immediate	perceptions	and	appetites.		In	arguing	that	there	are	important	parallels	between	Leibniz’s	treatment	of	finite	agency	and	his	handling	of	central	problems	in	the	natural	sciences,	including	the	paradigmatic	problem	of	determining	the	shape	of	the	catenary,	the	present	paper	has	also	aimed	to	bring	out	some	hidden	connections	between	some	of	Leibniz’s	seemingly	most	distant	studies.		In	doing	so,	it	may	hope	to	lend	a	measure	of	support	to	the	hoary,	if	embattled	view	of	Leibniz	as	one	of	the	great	system	builders	of	the	early	modern	period.				
